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Security Council

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Letter dated 23 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 21 August 2018 from the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights, which is run by a Rohingya refugee named Mohib Bullah (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Karel J.G. **van Oosterom**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 23 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

This month marks one year since Burmese forces ethnically cleansed over 700,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State. We — Rohingya refugees, diaspora groups and Burmese human rights groups — have spent the past 12 months coming to grips with the catastrophic toll of the Burmese Government's atrocities, and assessing the steps needed to move forward.

The scale of the Burmese Government's atrocities include — but are not limited to — the systematic use of force and intimidation of civilians, killing of men, women and children, sexual violence and the deliberate destruction and burning of homes and property. Those of us in the camps survived these atrocities, but tens of thousands of civilians did not. These victims deserve justice, and we deserve a credible pathway home.

We were cautiously optimistic when, in the spring of 2018, the Security Council chose to visit Cox's Bazar and Rakhine State. We were similarly hopeful when, in July, the United Nations Secretary-General visited our shelters in Bangladesh and called on Member States to increase the pressure on Burma, to ensure our safe return home. Like the Secretary-General, we believed that Council members could overcome the divisions that impeded action, and take the steps necessary to enable a safe, dignified and voluntary return home. We fear, however, that our hopes will not be realized.

One year after our ethnic cleansing, Burma has still not shut down its internally displaced persons camps. A total of 128,000 people (the vast majority of them Rohingya) remain interned in State-run camps. The exodus of refugees from Burma into Bangladesh continues, because conditions inside Burma have not improved — on the contrary, conditions have only gotten worse. Our brothers and sisters inside Burma report stronger restrictions on their movement. New bans on religious instruction and the building of places of worship to study the Bible and Qur'an are further stifling religious freedom. Religious and ethnic minorities continue to be denied access to livelihoods, education and basic health services — and are met with State-sponsored violence. This year, hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians have been displaced by the Burmese army's assaults in Kachin, Shan and Khayin States, where they are subject to indiscriminate shelling and used by the Burmese military as human shields and mine sweepers. Even non-violent student protesters in Yangon have not been spared.

Burma's Government will never voluntarily create the conditions necessary for the return of the Rohingya. Despite its attempts at window-dressing reform, it has taken no steps to address the root causes of the Rohingya crisis. On the contrary, the Government refuses to grant the Rohingya citizenship, or even recognize the term "Rohingya". State authorities thwart a legitimate, international effort to bring war criminals to account and deliver the justice that victims deserve. Indeed, we have no confidence in our Government's so-called "Commission of Enquiry", the sixth such mechanism created by Aung San Suu Kyi's Government to date. Like the numerous mechanisms before it, this, too, is designed only to delay and distract. Its mission is not to deliver justice for victims, but to defer international pressure on war criminals. The Burmese Government desperately hopes that the world's attention will recede and the plight of the Rohingya will be forgotten. Only you, members of the Security Council, can ensure that this is not the case and that pressure remains firmly on the Burmese Government. We therefore urge the Council to increase efforts to:

- **Oversee and monitor the repatriation process**. This requires not only regular reporting on any repatriation agreement to the Security Council, but also direct, meaningful and sustained consultation with the Rohingya. No decisions about our future should be taken without our input. If any repatriation process is to be voluntary, then we cannot be excluded from it. No agreement — including the memorandum of understanding between Burma and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/United Nations Development Programme — can be effective or credible if it is forged without our consent.

- **Maintain pressure on Burma to address the root causes of the Rohingya crisis**. A sustainable solution will not be achieved until the Burmese Government restores our citizenship and recognizes our humanity and provides the Rohingya — and all Burmese minorities — with the rights we deserve.

- **Secure a credible accountability process**. Burma's Commission of Enquiry is a sham. For victims to have confidence in an accountability process, the Council should refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. In the absence of a referral, Member States should establish an international, impartial and independent mechanism for Burma, to collect evidence of atrocities and create trial-ready cases.

To achieve these goals, we recommend that the Council establish benchmarks through which to ensure that the Burmese Government is improving the situation on the ground. Such benchmarks should include:

(i) **Recognition/restoration of our status as Rohingya**. Burma must stop denying our status as Rohingya.

(ii) **Prisoner release and the dropping of charges**. All those arbitrarily detained by Burmese authorities should be released, including the two Reuters journalists who revealed atrocities against the Rohingya. As a first step, the legal charges against these journalists should be dropped.

(iii) **Guarantees of non-reprisal**. We are deeply concerned that those who return will face imprisonment or reprisal by the regime. Burma must give clear guarantees that returnees will not be persecuted, and Rohingya civil servants will be allowed to keep their positions.

(iv) **Closure of internally displaced persons camps**. Internally displaced persons camps in Sittwe and elsewhere should be dismantled, and their residents permitted free access to return home. Construction of new internally displaced persons camps should be immediately halted.

(v) **Free access to Rakhine State by media, human rights groups and the United Nations**. If Burma is committed to reform, journalists, human rights groups and the United Nations — including the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar — must be allowed full, unfettered access to all areas of interest.

(vi) **End to national verification cards**. For generations, identification documents have been used to institutionalize the Rohingya's secondary status as non-citizens. Burma's use of national verification cards is a veiled attempt to deny our equality and dignity as Burmese nationals — and it must end.

(vii) **Ensure freedom of religion, education, health, movement and access to markets**. The fundamental rights of all ethnic and religious minorities in Burma must be guaranteed — in law and in practice.

(viii) **Rehabilitate our land, villages, property**. Our homeland in Rakhine State has been destroyed. We cannot return until our original land, villages and property are fully rehabilitated and returned to us.

(ix) **Direct, meaningful and sustained consultation with Rohingya. Burma must meaningfully gauge our views and garner our input**. It is not enough simply to hear us: we Rohingya must have a meaningful role in shaping the terms of any future repatriation process. This includes the establishment of a strong memorandum of understanding between the Rohingya and the Burmese Government.

(x) **Agree United Nations security presence in Rakhine State**. We cannot return to Burma until our safety inside Rakhine State is assured. A United Nations civilian observer mission on the ground, inside Rakhine State, would begin to provide the assurances we need to make a safe, secure and voluntary return.

Meeting the aforementioned benchmarks will help build our confidence in the process and create the conditions in which we can return to our homeland. Failing to meet these benchmarks, however, and failing to achieve tangible progress on the ground (which United Nations agencies have themselves called for) should incite a serious, targeted response from Member States. When it comes to Burma, the Security Council can no longer afford to engage in business as usual. Trade and military deals with the Burmese Government should be reviewed and, where necessary, rescinded. You have now seen first-hand the consequences of Burma's crimes against humanity. We hope that our suffering will not ebb from your memory, but will instead compel the Security Council to apply the pressure needed to ensure tangible progress by the Burmese Government.

(*Signed*) Mohib **Bullah**
Chair
Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights
Kutupalong, Ukhiya, Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh

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United Nations Support Mission in Libya

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2376 (2017), covers political and security developments in Libya, provides an overview of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the country and outlines the activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) since the issuance of my previous report on 7 May 2018 (S/2018/429).

II. Political and security-related developments

2. On 2 July, I announced the appointment of Stephanie T. Williams of the United States of America as the new Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs in Libya. She took up her functions immediately.

3. During the reporting period, my Special Representative continued to engage with Libyan, regional and international stakeholders to support the implementation of the United Nations action plan. He also endeavoured to facilitate discussions on viable options to hold national elections in 2018, as foreseen by the plan and requested by the Security Council (see S/PRST/2018/11). Overall, stakeholders remained supportive of the United Nations action plan as the means to resolve the Libyan crisis.

4. Meanwhile, the security situation remained volatile. The mid-June attempt to capture key oil facilities in the oil crescent region resulted in loss of life and destruction of infrastructure. Following a military offensive that generated numerous reports of human rights violations, the Libyan National Army announced that it had assumed full control over the eastern city of Darnah at the end of June. In Tripoli, tension increased as a result of fighting to control the capital. Intercommunal conflict continued in southern Libya, where armed clashes at Sabha's Elena Castle resulted in several deaths.

Implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement

5. During the reporting period, members of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continued to discuss limited amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement, which aimed to create a reformed and more inclusive executive authority. However, no consensus was reached on the proposals.

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6. Meanwhile, the United Nations continued its efforts to stimulate broad participation in the political process. In that regard, the national conference process brought together 7,000 Libyan men and women in more than 40 towns and cities across the country. The consultations provided an opportunity for people to voice their aspirations and concerns. The Libyans consulted requested an end to the transition period. They highlighted the need to unify State institutions through elections. They emphasized the need to protect Libya's national wealth and improve the distribution of resources. Special events were also organized for women, youth and internally displaced persons.

International and regional engagement

7. From 11 to 13 May, as part of the meeting of the African Union High-level Committee on Libya, the Government of Senegal hosted an inter-Libyan reconciliation meeting in Dakar. The meeting included the Presidents of Senegal and the Congo, as well as Libyan representatives of former regime loyalists and their opponents. Participants called for a referendum on the constitutional proposal. They also advocated a greater African Union role in efforts to address the Libyan crisis.

8. On 21 May, Algeria hosted a tripartite meeting between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. The ministers reiterated their support for the United Nations action plan and finding a political solution to the crisis in Libya. On 9 June, the leaders of the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America) reiterated their support for the implementation of the United Nations action plan to foster a stable and democratic Libya.

9. On 29 May, four major Libyan actors met in Paris under the auspices of the United Nations. The event was hosted by Emmanuel Macron, President of France. The Libyan actors — Prime Minister Faiez Serraj, Speaker of the House of Representatives Agila Saleh Essa Gwaider, President of the High Council of State Khaled al-Meshri and General Khalifa Haftar of the Libyan National Army — committed themselves to working constructively with the United Nations to bring about parliamentary and presidential elections in a secure environment by 10 December 2018 and to respect the results of the elections. They recognized the importance of developing a constitutional basis for elections. They expressed support for my Special Representative's consultations with Libyan authorities on a proposal and timeline for adopting the constitution. The Security Council welcomed the commitment expressed by these Libyan actors, as well as the positive momentum generated by the Paris conference (see S/PRST/2018/11). I also welcomed the meeting.

Situation in the western region

10. During the reporting period, the security situation in the western region remained precarious. There were heightened tensions over security control of the capital and hostilities in the oil crescent. Following the release of the report of the State Audit Bureau for 2017 (see para. 21 below), clashes erupted on 24 May between rival forces in Tripoli. On 25 and 26 May, elements of the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade and the Abu Salim armed group forced units of the Presidential Guard from their posts and briefly detained the head of the Guard, General Najmi al-Nakoua. Tensions increased in Tripoli over rumours that armed groups from neighbouring cities planned to displace armed groups in Tripoli affiliated with the Government of National Accord. UNSMIL continued to engage with those groups, specifically those in Misratah, particularly during a meeting on 13 May to promote dialogue and de-escalation.

11. There were also continued reports of theft, attacks, clashes and kidnappings. On 26 June, following a statement supportive of the decision of the Libyan National Army to hand over oil facilities to the "interim Government", an unknown armed group attacked the Vice-President of the Presidency Council, Fathi al-Majbari. The Vice-President escaped unharmed, but he resigned on 20 July. In Zintan, continuous competition over resources between rival armed groups, mostly related to fuel smuggling and human trafficking, escalated into armed skirmishes on 21 May. In that regard, an armed group briefly held civilians in order to exchange them for fuel trucks confiscated by a rival armed group. On 19 May, in Ujaylat city, fierce fighting took place between armed groups over revenue from illegal activities. As a result, one civilian was hit by a stray bullet and accidentally killed. On 23 May, 23 illegal migrants attempting to escape were injured when traffickers shot them at a warehouse in Bani Walid. Peaceful demonstrations over the delivery of basic services were also reported in Tripoli.

Situation in the eastern region

12. On 7 May, following the two-year-long military encirclement of the city of Darnah by the Libyan National Army, a military operation was launched against the Darnah Mujahidin Shura Council. Ahead of the attack, the Shura Council dissolved and allied itself with other armed elements to form the Darnah Protection Force. Ground forces were used in combination with intensive aerial bombardment and artillery shelling with sophisticated air support. The military operation left at least 27 civilians dead and 30 others injured. While 140 Libyan National Army members were reportedly killed, the number of Darnah Protection Force members killed is unknown. Most civilian casualties were caused by the use of indiscriminate fire and unguided weapons, such as artillery and mortars, by the Libyan National Army in densely populated residential areas, as well as crossfire and exploded remnants of war. When restrictions on civilian movement were eased on 29 May, thousands of families fled to safety. Other civilians remained trapped in areas of active conflict without sufficient food, water or access to medical treatment. On 28 June, General Haftar announced that Darnah had been "liberated". As of 5 August, intermittent Libyan National Army operations against elements of the Darnah Protection Force continued in the old city.

13. On 14 June, members of the former Petroleum Facilities Guard and the Benghazi Defence Brigades, as well as foreign elements, launched an offensive against the Libyan National Army to capture the Ra's Lanuf and Sidrah facilities in the oil crescent. After days of armed clashes, resulting in an unconfirmed number of deaths and injuries, the Libyan National Army succeeded in recapturing the oil facilities on 21 June. In an unprecedented move, on 25 June, the Libyan National Army announced the handing over of the oil facilities in the oil crescent and in other areas under its control to the National Oil Corporation associated with the "interim Government" based in eastern Libya. However, on 11 July, following Prime Minister Serraj's request to the Security Council to establish an international technical committee to audit Libyan finances, the Libyan National Army agreed to hand over control of the oil crescent facilities to the Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation. In a press statement dated 19 July (www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13429.doc.htm), the Security Council welcomed the announcement that the National Oil Corporation was resuming its work on behalf of all Libyans and encouraged Libyan leaders to work towards the unification of the country's institutions within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement.

Situation in the southern region

14. The situation in the south continued to be dominated by the conflict between Tebu and Awlad Suleiman communities. After an increase in small-scale confrontations and sniper attacks, on 12 May, Tebu forces took the strategic Elena Castle and the adjoining headquarters of the Sixth Brigade affiliated with Awlad Sulayman. Approximately 10 people were reported killed and 45 injured in the attack. The Tebu forces then retreated after destroying the fortifications, making the site indefensible. Efforts to resolve the dispute between the two sides, including those by the Presidency Council, have so far failed. In the meantime, restrictions on access to basic services based on tribal affiliation remain in place in various locations.

15. On 31 May, forces linked to the Petroleum Facilities Guard attacked the Tamanhint airbase controlled by the Libyan National Army, killing four of its members. The Libyan National Army continued to conduct periodic operations against Chadian opposition groups, including attacks on Umm al-Aranib, 90 kilometres south of Sabha, on 28 May and on 2 and 3 June. Kidnappings and insecurity continued to be reported in the south. On 23 June, three Turkish engineers kidnapped in Awbari were released after spending 233 days in captivity.

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Libya

16. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continued activities around its former stronghold of Sirte, as well as in other areas of Libya. On 23 May, ISIL claimed responsibility for a suicide vehicle-borne improvised device that had detonated the day before near a Libyan National Army checkpoint, south-east of Ajdabiya. ISIL also claimed responsibility for the simultaneous attack against another Libyan National Army checkpoint north of Awjilah. On 2 June, ISIL targeted a police station in Qanan, south-east of Ajdabiya, killing one civilian and injuring another five. ISIL published a claim that its fighters had killed two Libyan National Army members during clashes at a checkpoint in the Jufrah district on 6 June.

17. As part of a military operation launched by the Presidency Council in early April, four suspected ISIL fighters were arrested on 9 June in the Saddadah area, near Bani Walid, following local reports of ISIL movements. On 5 and 13 June, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), in cooperation with Government of National Accord, announced its conduct of air strikes against alleged ISIL members south-east of Bani Walid, resulting in the death of five suspected ISIL fighters, including Abd al-A'ati Ashtaiwy, a key ISIL cadre in Sirte. On 24 July, ISIL claimed responsibility for killing two Libyan National Army personnel during an attack on an army checkpoint in Ageila town, west of Ajdabiya. In the ensuing pursuit operation, 11 ISIL elements were killed.

Economic situation

18. On 12 May, the Presidency Council and the Central Bank of Libya reached an agreement on the 2018 budget. The new budget included public expenditures of 42.5 billion Libyan dinars ($31 billion), as compared with 37.5 billion Libyan dinars (USD 27.4 billion) for 2017. The increased expenditure reflected the integration of salary expenditures for officials in eastern Libya previously paid by the unrecognized "interim Government" and increased salary payments for security actors. Salaries make up the main portion of the budget, with an estimated 1.78 million Libyans on the public payroll. The budget deficit is nearly 10 billion Libyan dinars ($7.3 billion).

19. The agreed budget was based on projections for public revenues stemming from oil exports. According to the Ministry of Finance, revenues from the export of oil and gas surpassed expectations from the beginning of the year through 31 May,

accounting for 13.34 billion Libyan dinars ($9.7 billion). While oil production averaged 1 million barrels per day during that period, the recent attack on oil facilities in the oil crescent and subsequent events have significantly disrupted oil production, which was reduced to 315,000 barrels per day.

20. The eighth Libyan economic dialogue was convened in Tunis on 5 June. The meeting, which brought together representatives of the Government of National Accord, the Central Bank, the National Oil Corporation, the House of Representatives, the High Council of State and the State Audit Bureau, concluded with an agreement on economic measures, including subsidy reform, direct cash transfers, increased liquidity and devaluation. On 10 June, the Central Bank announced the launch of a tax scheme for foreign currency transactions to reduce the gap between the official and black-market exchange rates. As of 27 June, the parallel market exchange rate stood at 6.85 Libyan dinars to one United States dollar, compared with the official rate of 1.38 Libyan dinars to one United States dollar.

21. The State Audit Bureau issued a report on 23 May estimating that public expenditures totalled 277 billion Libyan dinars ($202 billion) between 2012 and 2017 and that public debt reached 58 billion Libyan dinars ($42 billion) during that period. The report contained a range of allegations of corruption and financial mismanagement that caused outcry among Libyans. The report also suggested that the increase in public revenues in 2017 had not translated into an improved economic situation. In a letter to the Security Council dated 10 July, Prime Minister Serraj proposed that an international technical committee be established to review the financial arrangements of the internationally recognized Central Bank and the parallel bank in the east.

III. Constitution-making process

22. A commitment to the establishment of a constitutional framework to end the country's transitional period was reiterated during the Paris conference (see para. 9 above). Efforts in this regard continued, including through UNSMIL consultations with Libyan legal experts and national and international partners on a constitutional framework ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections. The House of Representatives resumed its discussions on the necessary legislation for a referendum and the Constitution Drafting Assembly continued its outreach efforts on the constitutional proposal, including through briefings to the international community. On 29 July, the Chair of the Constitution Drafting Assembly, Nuh Abdel Sayed, announced his resignation. The session of the House of Representatives held on 30 and 31 July to discuss the draft constitutional referendum law concluded without a vote. Following a further session held on 13 August, the vote was deferred again.

IV. Other activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

A. Electoral support

23. Following the 2 May terrorist attack on the headquarters of the High National Electoral Commission in Tripoli, which killed at least 13 people and destroyed parts of the premises, the Government of National Accord provided 2 million Libyan dinars ($1.5 million) of emergency funding for the Commission's immediate rehabilitation. In addition, international partners agreed to fund rehabilitation work for the Commission through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project entitled "Promoting elections for the people of Libya", currently funded by the

European Union, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

24. On 12 June, the Government granted the High National Electoral Commission a compound in Tripoli to establish its new headquarters. Following an assessment conducted by the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat, efforts were made to rehabilitate the compound in line with the Department's recommendations. UNSMIL and UNDP, in cooperation with an implementing partner funded by the United States Agency for International Development, supported the Commission in the planning and coordination of the rehabilitation and engineering works on the new site. The re-establishment of a functional headquarters for the Commission is essential for the conduct of any balloting events in 2018.

25. Despite the challenges following the attack on the High National Electoral Commission, the UNSMIL-led integrated electoral assistance team, which includes capacities from UNDP, continued its efforts to support preparations for the 2018 balloting events, as foreseen by the United Nations action plan and agreed to at the Paris conference (see para. 9 above). Advice was provided on electoral operations and timelines pending adoption of the electoral legislation, information technology and data management, procurement of electoral materials, logistics, out-of-country voting and field operations. In addition, limited technical advice and information technology equipment was provided to the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections in preparation for local elections in 2018. UNSMIL also engaged in consultations with the High National Electoral Commission and the State Elections Commission, the new electoral affairs office within the Ministry of the Interior, on the need for creating effective mechanisms with a clear division of labour among defence and internal security forces for electoral security.

B. Human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law

26. During the reporting period, armed groups across Libya continued to commit violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in a climate of continued impunity.

27. Civilians, including children, continued to bear the brunt of the escalation of fighting and violence. During the reporting period, UNSMIL documented 99 civilian casualties (44 deaths and 55 injuries), which is an increase from previous periods. Leading causes of casualties among civilians included shelling, explosive remnants of war, gunfire, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and air strikes.

28. The escalation of conflict in Darnah generated numerous reports of human rights violations and failure to protect civilians on the part of the Libyan National Army. Indiscriminate weapons were reportedly used in populated areas, and civilians were unable to move in and out of Darnah freely and safely. Libyan National Army fighters pillaged, damaged, destroyed and appropriated private homes in several neighbourhoods that had fallen under their control, including Shiha, Mbakh, and Sahel al-Sharki. In some instances, the properties of suspected Darnah Protection Force fighters and their families appeared to have been targeted. On 5 June, the city's main functioning public hospital was closed owing to shelling, shortages of medical supplies and ongoing fighting in the vicinity. While medical services gradually resumed in Darnah neighbourhoods under the control of the Libyan National Army, concerns remained regarding the lack of access to medical treatment for those trapped in areas of active fighting. During the reporting period, medical professionals reported at least four preventable civilian deaths due to the absence of medical supplies or lack of safe access to medical treatment.

Unlawful deprivation of liberty, detention and torture

29. Armed groups continued to take hostage or otherwise unlawfully deprive civilians of their liberty. Civilians were targeted for financial or political gain, on the basis of their tribal origin or family identity or for their perceived political affiliations and opinions.

30. Libyan National Army fighters reportedly detained civilian men from Darnah at checkpoints and at their homes. Those taken included civil society activists, religious figures, medical professionals and local leaders, some of whom seemed to have been targeted solely for exercising their right to freedom of expression. Despite repeated requests, UNSMIL was unable to visit prisons and other detention facilities in eastern Libya under the control of the military police or the Libyan National Army since 2014.

31. Across the country, arbitrary detention and torture continued to be widespread. Some 6,400 individuals were held in 26 official prisons under the Ministry of Justice, an estimated 75 to 80 per cent of them in pretrial detention. Thousands of others were held in facilities nominally under the control of the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defence, as well as facilities directly run by armed groups. Those held had little opportunity to challenge the legality of their detention or seek redress for violations suffered.

32. In relation to detention facilities, UNSMIL continued to receive credible reports of prolonged and arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment, enforced disappearances, poor detention conditions, medical neglect and the denial of visits from families and lawyers. During the reporting period, UNSMIL gathered credible information on torture and other ill-treatment at the Mitiga detention facility controlled by the Special Deterrence Force and facilities operated by the Central Security Abu Salim armed group, the counter-terrorism unit in Abu Salim, the general investigations apparatus in Tripoli, the joint operations room in Misratah and the general investigations body in eastern Libya. Despite repeated requests, UNSMIL continued to be denied access to the Mitiga detention facility, where an estimated 2,600 men, women and children are believed to be held, most without charge or trial.

33. On 7 May, the Presidency Council adopted decree No. 555 of 2018. Under the terms of the decree, the Special Deterrence Force was renamed "Deterrence Body for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism" and granted a nation-wide remit, independent budget and extensive powers, including of arrest, detention and surveillance. After concerns were raised by national and international stakeholders, Prime Minister Serraj sent the decree to the Ministry of the Interior for review.

Summary executions

34. On 12 June, a video emerged on social media depicting the beating and summary execution of a captured man, allegedly by fighters affiliated with the Libyan National Army in the area of Sahel al-Sharki in Darnah. The following day, the Libyan National Army announced investigations into the video, but no information was shared on the progress or findings. Previous promises of investigations into alleged summary executions and other possible war crimes committed by fighters affiliated with the Libyan National Army have not led to prosecutions.

35. The exact legal status and whereabouts of a field commander with the special forces under the Libyan National Army, Mahmoud al-Werfalli, who is the subject of arrest warrants issued on 15 August 2017 and 4 July 2018 by the International Criminal Court for the crime of murder for his alleged involvement in summary executions, remain unclear. On 11 July, General Haftar ordered the arrest of Mahmoud al-Werfalli.

Groups in vulnerable situations

Migrants

36. Migrants and refugees continued to be vulnerable to deprivation of liberty and arbitrary detention in official and unofficial places of detention; torture, including sexual violence; abduction for ransom; extortion; forced labour; and unlawful killings. The number of detainees increased owing to more interceptions at sea and closure of sea routes to migrants, preventing their departure. Perpetrators included State officials, armed groups, smugglers, traffickers and criminal gangs.

37. During the reporting period, UNSMIL gathered information regarding detention conditions, torture and other abuses committed at the Zuwarah detention centre overseen by the Department for Combating Illegal Migration. On 16 May, UNSMIL was denied access to the facility by the mayor of Zuwarah. UNSMIL was unable to conduct human rights monitoring visits to any detention facilities under the control of the Department for Combating Illegal Migration owing to bureaucratic hurdles imposed by the protocol office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the public relations department of the Ministry of the Interior.

38. On 7 June, the Security Council placed global asset freezes and travel bans on six leaders of human trafficking networks, four Libyan nationals and two Eritrean nationals. They include Abdel Rahman Milad (known as Bija), former head of the Libyan Coast Guard in al-Zawiya, who was suspended from his post on 22 June.

Women and girls

39. Women and girls were arbitrarily detained, at times on the basis of their family affiliation or for "moral crimes" such as engaging in consensual sexual relations outside of marriage. Many were held in the Mitiga detention centre, the Jawwiyah prison and facilities of the Central Security/Abu Salim and the Department for Combating Illegal Migration without female guards, heightening the risk of sexual abuse. Women were strip-searched by or in front of male guards, and some were subjected to intrusive cavity searches. Migrant women and girls were particularly vulnerable to rape, forced prostitution and other forms of sexual violence.

40. The situation in the Judaydan Women's Prison remained of particular concern. Special Deterrence Force members beat women, including with water pipes and the backs of rifles, placed them in prolonged solitary confinement and interfered with visitation rights. Cameras were also installed in the prison's corridors, thereby raising concerns about privacy. Three detainees were transferred in April from the Judaydah Women's Prison to the Mitiga detention facility by order of the Attorney General, reportedly under pressure from the Special Deterrence Force, and remained held at Mitiga with limited access to family visits.

Journalists and activists

41. Activists, journalists and other media professionals were victims of targeted attacks, intimidation and detention. During the reporting period, a journalist covering migration and abuses by armed groups fled the country after having received death threats through her social media accounts and directly by telephone.

42. Two prominent media figures and organizers of an annual media award, Suliman Gashout and Mohammed Yaghubi, remain detained arbitrarily at the Mitiga detention centre since their arrests without warrant on 29 April 2018. They have yet to appear in front of judicial authorities.

43. A human rights activist continued to be held without charge or trial since his arrest on 15 May. In mid-June, he was reportedly transferred from the General

Security Apparatus detention facility in Bab Tajoura to the Ayn Zarah (B) Prison. The exact reasons behind his detention remain unclear. Following his arrest, unidentified armed men confiscated his documents and laptops.

Transitional justice and national reconciliation

44. Over the past 18 months, an UNSMIL-led project funded by the Peacebuilding Fund and supported by UNDP has promoted local dialogue and contributed to the signing of reconciliation agreements throughout Libya. UNSMIL endeavoured to raise new funding to sustain and expand ongoing local dialogue processes in support of the political process and transitional justice in Libya. The Governments of Italy and the United States committed financial support that will ensure the continuation of a comprehensive reconciliation programme.

45. Building on their initial meeting in February 2018 and their agreed road map for reconciliation, delegations from Ghadamis and the Tuareg communities displaced in Awal attended a three-day training session in Tunis in May. The objective was to enhance their capacity to document the gross human rights violations committed by both sides and to identify damage and appropriate reparations mechanisms. Around 220 families remain displaced because of the conflict.

46. In May, the Presidency Council established by decree an independent commission for the search for missing persons, on the basis of previous legislation and the Libyan Political Agreement. While the decision was positive in principle, concerns were raised that the decree did not adequately protect the future commission from political interference and reflect international best practices regarding the protection of all persons from enforced disappearances. On 1[illegible], a group of Libyan and international legal, constitutional and forensics experts convened in Tunis to propose amendments to the decree, in partnership with the International Commission for Missing Persons.

47. On 3 June, local officials from Misratah and Tawurgha' signed a reconciliation charter, which fell far short of international human rights standards. The charter failed to ensure the unconditional and safe return of some 40,000 Tawurghans forcibly displaced since the 2011 armed conflict. The charter's preamble reproduced a one-sided narrative of the conflict, referencing alleged crimes committed by the Tawurgha' community. The charter further undermined the Tawurghans' rights to freedom of expression and association, placed returns and security under the control of armed groups from Misratah and excluded a range of Tawurghans from the possibility of returning to their home town. The Tawurgha' Shura Council and other members of civil society opposed conditions set by the charter. In an apparent effort to compel those critical of the charter to vacate the temporary shelter at Qararat al-Qataf camp in Bani Walid, the Tawurgha local council removed its mobile medical clinic, generator and water tanks, transferring them to a school inside Tawurgha' used to shelter returnees to the city. Between 15 and 20 June, Misratah armed groups established a checkpoint near the entrance to Tawurgha', checking the identification of displaced Tawurghan returning to celebrate Eid al-Fitr in their home town. Some identity cards of internally displaced persons were reportedly confiscated and only returned to them once they left the city.

Support and capacity-building for national non-governmental organizations

48. Between 7 and 10 May, UNSMIL organized a series of training workshops in Tripoli for human rights defenders and lawyers. The purpose of the meetings was to enhance knowledge of and expertise in human rights monitoring and reporting techniques; the use of international human rights mechanisms, including special

procedures under the Human Rights Council; and international human rights and humanitarian law.

49. On 12 May, UNSMIL facilitated a consultative workshop aimed at improving coordination among national civil society organizations working on the human rights of migrants and extending their work to cover remote locations within Libya. The meeting led to the establishment of a coalition of organizations aimed at improving the human rights monitoring of detention facilities, raising community awareness and enhancing the institutional capacity of civil society.

Human rights due diligence policy

50. The United Nations system in Libya continued its efforts towards the implementation of the United Nations human rights due diligence policy (A/67/775-S/2013/110, annex). UNSMIL and the United Nations country team are currently reviewing their support for Libyan security forces, with a view to mitigating identified risks of grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law or refugee law being committed by non-United Nations security forces that are recipients of United Nations support.

51. A risk assessment and mitigating measures with respect to United Nations support for the Department of Combating Illegal Migration are currently under consideration. The measures include increased monitoring of human rights law compliance by recipients of support, human rights screening and enhancing accountability.

C. Security sector

Support for Libyan planning for interim security arrangements and the unification of the security forces

52. UNSMIL continued to develop, in consultation with the Libyan authorities and its international partners, a security framework to support national authorities in establishing a unified State security service that is effective, accountable, representative, responsive to the needs of all Libyans and placed under civilian control. The approach builds on three mutually reinforcing tiers: strategic level unification of the army and police, institutional capacity-building, and community security planning and implementation.

53. In addition, UNSMIL continued to monitor efforts to build consensus between Libyan and international actors involved in the army unification process. My Special Representative continued to monitor developments in the Cairo unification talks and their complementarity with the United Nations action plan. Libyan military officers participated in six meetings to consider options for the unification of the armed forces and enhancement of their capacity (see S/2018/429, para. 62). The Mission continued to encourage the use of legitimate State security institutions rather than non- or quasi-State armed groups.

54. Within this framework approach, UNSMIL is developing a strategy to assist national authorities in dealing with the Libyan armed groups. As part of the process, UNSMIL conducted a perception survey of more than 40 armed groups and their leaders from across Libya. The survey was conducted through bilateral interviews, focus group sessions and workshops, in conjunction with local and international non-governmental organizations and in coordination with the Presidency Council. Such engagement with the armed groups served to enhance their support for the United Nations action plan. The results of this bottom-up process fed into a draft UNSMIL armed groups strategy, which sets out a long-term framework for supporting

Libyan stabilization and integration measures. Meanwhile, consultations continue with the Libyan authorities, the armed groups and the international community.

55. UNSMIL continued to convene regular international security sector working group meetings, now held simultaneously in Tripoli and Tunis, attracting up to 35 Member States and international organizations, thereby facilitating international consensus in this sector and more broadly in others. Plans to reinvigorate national ownership of this mechanism are well advanced. UNSMIL began work towards consolidating the security arrangements in other regions of the country. The Mission is encouraging dialogue among all the key security actors in Benghazi and Misratah. It is working closely with UNDP, through the Policing and Security Joint Programme, with the aim of providing technical advice and support to the Ministry of the Interior; sensitizing Tripoli security actors to the requirements of the human rights due diligence policy; and building community policing through the establishment of a model police station in the Andalus area of Tripoli.

56. Progress has been made since the establishment of the Army Joint Operations Centre on 7 September 2017 and the appointment of the Army Chief of Staff on 30 August 2017. The Chief of Staff sponsored a review of military structures in Tripoli which resulted in over 30 "ghost" battalions being identified for removal from the national security apparatus through Presidency Council decree No. 555, adopted on 7 May 2018. Despite this progress, the security sector in general continued to suffer from a lack of political will and government financial support, the creation of parallel forces and coordination mechanisms and continued dependency of the Government on selected armed groups as illustrated by the adoption of decree No. 555.

Arms and ammunition management

57. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) continued to assist Libyan authorities in their efforts to address uncontrolled proliferation of arms and ammunition. In June, technical support was provided to Libyan security authorities on weapons and ammunition management. A safety assessment of a missile storage site in Gharyan was conducted in preparation for the disposal of liquid fuel propellant for missiles. Contingent on funding, UNMAS will secure the site and prepare for disposal. UNMAS continues to face difficulties with the systematic exchange of information among national actors, which complicates a coordinated approach to addressing the challenges posed by explosive hazards.

D. Women's empowerment

58. Since the launch of the United Nations action plan, Libyan women have been engaged through civic movements and various forums in promoting women's political participation. On 23 June, the Women's Empowerment Network, supported by UNSMIL, convened to discuss actions to be taken by women to contribute to the establishment of a constitutional basis for elections. The participants agreed to continue discussions on the constitutional basis for elections, as well future opportunities and challenges for women, with a broad inclusive group of women from Libya at the next meeting in mid-July.

59. In May, 24 women from Libyan political parties and newly established political movements were convened by UNSMIL to discuss opportunities that political parties can provide to advance women's leadership in the planned elections. Subsequently, the participants formed a network to promote the nomination of women in the elections. The National Front Party and Nation Forces Alliance have since assigned women to executive positions, including Deputy President and General Secretary.

60. The overall participation of women in the national conference process was estimated at 30 per cent. Designated sessions for women were organized to encourage increased participation of women across Libya in the process. UNSMIL provided advice and training to the facilitators of those sessions, including on methodology for reporting at community level.

E. Young people, peace and security

61. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization conducted interviews with Libyan youth in partnership with the Libyan Youth Voice Organization to identify core values for peacebuilding in 12 schools in Sirte and Misratah. This will inform future United Nations activities related to youth, peace and security.

F. Coordination and international assistance

62. Significant progress was made towards the finalization of the United Nations strategic framework for the period 2019–2020. On 7 June, UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF presented the final draft of their country programme documents for 2019–2020, which will be considered by their respective executive boards in September 2018. On 15 May, the human rights working group, co-chaired by the Ministry of Justice and UNSMIL, was launched under the coordination framework for international assistance. At the request of the Ministry of Planning and with financial assistance from the United Kingdom, a new database was developed to inform evidence-based decision making and support the coordination of international assistance.

G. Humanitarian, stabilization and development assistance

63. The humanitarian situation remained fragile owing to the protracted political conflict and economic hardship. Periodic, but increasingly frequent, escalation of armed conflict resulted in displacement, while humanitarian actors often faced challenges or restrictions imposed on access.

64. The Libya Humanitarian Response Plan for 2018 remained poorly funded, with only 19 per cent of the required $313 million having been contributed. Protection and health were severely underfunded. Increasing respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law remained a key priority, which requires the implementation of a wide range of protection interventions for all vulnerable groups. Support for the dignified and safe return of internally displaced persons is also key and depends on urgent, systematic and increased access being granted to areas of active conflict, such as Darnah and southern Libya.

65. Humanitarian access to Darnah was severely limited. The Libyan Red Crescent, with support from international entities, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), covered the majority of the initial emergency needs of internally displaced persons around and inside the city. Later on, UNICEF addressed the needs of 1,000 displaced boys and girls while the multisectoral response to the population was scaled up to meet the needs of an additional 1,000 families and 36,000 schoolchildren previously assisted early in 2018.

66. During the reporting period, there were over 690,351 migrants in Libya, including women (9 per cent of identified migrants) and children (9 per cent), of whom 42 per cent were unaccompanied and 58 per cent accompanied. Between 8 May

and 28 June, 6,827 migrants arrived in Italy from Libya, while 276 deaths were recorded. At the same time, 3,557 migrants were returned to the shores of Libya by the Libyan Coast Guard. At disembarkation points, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and IOM provided individuals with medical and humanitarian assistance. From 1 January to 26 June, IOM assisted 8,710 migrants, of whom 2,235 were helped to return to 23 countries of origin through the voluntary repatriation programme.

67. Of the 53,713 refugees and asylum seekers registered with UNHCR in Libya, 1,469 were registered during the reporting period. In addition, some 4,000 refugees and asylum seekers are currently detained in Libya, according to UNHCR. During its 183 monitoring visits to detention centres during the reporting period, UNHCR provided 3,972 medical consultations and material support to detained migrants and refugees. Since November 2017, UNHCR has evacuated 1,858 refugees from Libya (1,536 to Niger, 312 to Italy and 10 to Romania), of whom 516 were evacuated during the reporting period.

68. More than 7,000 migrants were detained in official facilities. This figure does not include detention centres maintained by armed groups. To date, the Libyan authorities have reported the closure of 25 detention centres. To ensure that legal cases involving unaccompanied migrant children take into account the best interest of the child, UNICEF, IOM and UNHCR established an emergency best interest determination panel. To inform future programming, UNICEF is finalizing an assessment regarding unaccompanied and separated migrant children on the basis of primary data collected in Libya and Italy.

69. WHO deployed mobile medical teams to five health-care facilities in Sirte providing 4,000 persons with primary and specialized health care. Over 500 medical consultations were provided to internally displaced persons from Tawurgha' at a WHO-supported clinic in Qararat al-Qataf. The World Food Programme gradually increased its assistance during the reporting period, feeding up to 79,000 vulnerable people, of whom 52 per cent were female and 48 per cent male.

70. To enhance the capacity of local entities dealing with explosive remnants of war, including those supporting Government-led efforts to stabilize areas liberated from ISIL, UNMAS provided the Free Fields Foundation, a Libyan non-governmental organization, with medical and explosive ordnance disposal equipment and coordinated the delivery of disposal-related equipment and training for the Libyan military engineers and specialized police units. In Misratah, UNMAS continued efforts to destroy 200 tons of explosive remnants of war and to secure the ground for wider humanitarian action, early recovery and sustainable development. However, mine action actors were unable to carry out intensive clearance activities in Tawurgha' in preparation for a safe, dignified and durable return of internally displaced persons, as access was denied.

71. UNFPA, in partnership with the Ministry of Health, the Libyan Association for Midwives and the National Centre for Disease Control, organized a series of events for the International Day of the Midwife, including a workshop involving more than 100 midwives from all parts of Libya to review the midwifery regulations and set recommendations for advancing midwifery in Libya. It also deployed psychologists and social workers to primary health-care centres in Sirte, Jufrah, Benghazi, Tripoli and Sabha to provide integrated psychosocial support to victims of gender-based violence and women suffering from mental health issues.

72. On 25 June, UNFPA and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), in partnership with the Sirte municipal council and the Bureau of Statistics and Census and under the overall coordination of the Ministry of Planning, presented a profile report on Sirte city and its population to the international

community. The report includes the preliminary results of a multisectoral household survey and an urban functionality assessment, with a comprehensive review and analysis of primary and secondary data sources. Following protracted conflict in and around the city, the report informs future programming.

73. Programme delivery continued across Libya under the UNDP Stabilization Facility. On 7 and 8 May, in Tunis, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the National Economic and Social Board of Libya, in coordination with UNSMIL, co-organized a round table with experts on Libyan national priorities regarding combating corruption and money-laundering. Experts developed recommendations to help Libyans meet their obligations under the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

V. Deployment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and security arrangements

Operational concept and return to Libya

74. During the reporting period, UNSMIL continuously and gradually increased its presence in Tripoli and elsewhere in Libya. The Mission's expanding footprint enabled staff to intensify outreach and interaction with Libyan interlocutors throughout the country and to increase support to national counterparts, particularly leading up to the electoral processes. In addition, the Mission arranged short-term temporary presences of staff in Benghazi and conducted visits to other locations throughout the country.

75. In 2019, UNSMIL will continue to increase and intensify even further its engagement and support to national interlocutors and counterparts, political and security conditions permitting. To that end, it is foreseen that the Mission would consolidate its permanent presence in Libya. This transition would be carried out in phases, based on mandated operational priorities and taking into consideration political and security conditions. As a priority, the Mission plans to consolidate its presence in Tripoli, re-establish a stable presence in the east, namely Benghazi, and continue its regular outreach to other parts of the country, including the south. The Mission's staffing needs in all components will continue to be adjusted to ensure effective and efficient mandate delivery across the country.

Security and safety of staff members and operations

76. United Nations personnel in Libya continued to work in a high-risk security environment. Restrictions continued to be imposed on the movement of personnel in the country and on international staff travelling by air to Tripoli and other destinations within Libya.

VI. Observations

77. Important steps forward were taken in the implementation of the United Nations action plan to end Libya's transition. While elections must be held to renew the mandates of institutions in the country and establish a new executive authority, it is equally important that the proper conditions be in place. I urge the Libyan parties, and in particular the members of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, who were among the four Libyan actors represented at the Paris conference (see para. 9 above), to implement their commitments.

78. Escalation of conflict in the oil crescent and subsequent action by the Libyan National Army threatened to unravel progress achieved in the political process. I reiterate the importance of placing all natural resources, their production and their revenues, under the control of the recognized Libyan authorities. In that regard, I recall the request of the Security Council, in its resolution 2259 (2015)that the integrity and unity of internationally recognized national institutions, including the Central Bank, the National Oil Corporation and the Libyan Investment Authority, be protected. Dissolving parallel institutions is of paramount importance.

79. The people of Libya have expressed an overwhelming demand for a unified army and police and a sustainable solution to the issue of armed groups. There is a clear need to build professional, accountable and unified security institutions throughout the country. I encourage Member States to support Libyan efforts to transition to a State monopoly on legitimate and capable State security institutions, complemented by outreach to armed groups to foster their support for both the transition and the political process outlined in the United Nations action plan.

80. The security situation on the ground needs to improve in order to create an atmosphere conducive to elections. I commend the High National Electoral Commission for its efforts since the 2 May terrorist attack on its headquarters to ensure readiness to conduct elections and to facilitate Libya's democratic process. I remind all Libyan parties of their expressed commitment to improve the atmosphere for national elections.

81. Various Libyan authorities now accept that they need to take action to protect the country's wealth. In this regard, I call for greater transparency and accountability of Libyan economic and financial institutions. I welcome the request of Prime Minister Serraj to the Security Council to review the internationally recognized Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli and the central bank in the east. I have requested my Special Representative to provide early proposals to the Security Council, in the context of the United Nations action plan, taking into account his dialogue with all Libyan parties, as requested in the Council's press statement of 19 July (www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13429.doc.htm).

82. I am concerned by the economic situation in Libya, which threatens the stability and unity of the country. Economic stability, development and stronger growth, as well as government institutions to deliver public services to Libyan citizens, are of critical importance. In this regard, I urge all Libyan authorities to commit to the agreement to undertake economic reform that is fair and will deliver long-term gains for the benefit of the Libyan population, as agreed by key Libyan actors at the economic dialogue in June. UNSMIL will continue to support the Government of National Accord in the consolidation of economic arrangements, including reform and policy.

83. I welcome the continued strong engagement of Libyan women in political, peacebuilding, recovery and reconciliation processes. I commend the dedicated efforts made to ensure their participation in the national conference process and to underline the imperative of women's inclusion in the political process. The advancement of gender equality and women's full and effective participation in Libya's political and economic life is in Libya's interest and I urge all actors to implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) in particular.

84. I am concerned by the deteriorating humanitarian situation across parts of Libya. I commend Member States for their contributions to the Libya Stabilization Fund and encourage further funding for the Libya Humanitarian Response Plan, which is aimed at supporting 1.1 million people in need, particularly protection and health interventions for vulnerable Libyan communities.

85. I am concerned by the surge of civilian casualties amid the escalation of conflict and violence in the eastern city of Darnah and the oil crescent region. I call upon all parties to the conflict to fully respect international humanitarian law, including by taking all feasible precautions to protect civilians and to ensure that the wounded and sick, both civilians and those who have participated in hostilities, are cared for, including through medical evacuations. Parties to the conflict should also facilitate safe passage for civilians wishing to leave areas of active conflict.

86. I remain concerned about human rights violations and abuses committed in the context of detention, and the prolonged arbitrary detention of thousands of men, women and children without due process. I continue to call for the closure of detention centres and respect for the human rights of those who are detained. Authorities must prioritize the release of all those detained arbitrarily, provide humane treatment and conditions for those detained lawfully and ensure that all are afforded due process rights. To build a country on the foundations of the rule of law, authorities must signal a zero-tolerance policy for torture, summary executions and unlawful killings in custody, and the pursuit of accountability for past alleged abuses. They must also suspend all decisions integrating armed groups into State institutions without any vetting process to remove those reasonably suspected of committing human rights violations. Given the important role of truth-seeking in advancing reconciliation, an appropriate legal framework for an independent human remains identification process is crucial.

87. I welcome the Security Council's decision to impose sanctions on six leaders of human trafficking networks. I encourage the Libyan authorities to do more to identify and prosecute all those responsible for such heinous crimes and other violations and abuses against migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Libya. I also encourage Libyan authorities to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Court, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1970 (2011), to help bring about justice and accountability for crimes in Libya under international law.

88. I wish to reiterate my appreciation to the Government of Nepal for providing the personnel of the United Nations Guard Unit. I also wish to express my gratitude to my Special Representative for Libya, Ghassan Salamé, and to the staff of the United Nations system in Libya for their dedication and hard work in support of a peaceful end to the transition in Libya.

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Letter dated 24 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 23 and 24 August 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

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Annex to the letter dated 24 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (23 August 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 14 incidents of gunfire: 7 in Aleppo Governorate and 7 in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: three in Hama, one in Aleppo and one in Idlib.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has carried out one humanitarian operation: In Ma'arriyah and Ardah, Qunaytirah Governorate, 900 food parcels with a total weight of 3.75 tons were distributed.

In total, 1,904 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,932.01 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 258 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 89,410 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (24 August 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 15 incidents of gunfire: 8 in Ladhiqiyah Governorate and 7 in Aleppo Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has carried out two humanitarian operations:

- In Marrat, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, 650 food parcels with a total weight of 2.8 tons were distributed.
- In Dayr Ful, Homs Governorate, 650 food parcels with a total weight of 2.8 tons were distributed as humanitarian aid.

In total, 1,906 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,937.61 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 335 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 89,745 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.